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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
JAMES L. HATCH and DELLA L.
HATCH,

Case N(:).
8937

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents agree with the Statements of Fact
expressed in the Brief of Appellant, except to add that
Donald G. Prince, Land Examiner called by the State of
Utah, testified also on Cross-Examination that in virtually
all selections made by the State of Utah a prospective purchaser from the State had already chosen the land selected
and requested that State to acquire the same from the Federal Government. Thus the instant exchange, apparently
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2
contrary to the broad conclusion elicited from Mr. Prince
on Direct Examination, effected a result equally as beneficial to the State of Utah, and as consistent with the statute directing a "compacting" of the State's interests, as
would have an exchange locating the selected lands contiguous to pre-existing state holdings and in effect did
"compact" the State's holdings because it extricated the
State's interests from a location inaccessibly within the
boundaries of a national forest (Tr. p. 33).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY
THE STATE OF UTAH IN A PROPRIETARY
CAPACITY; HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING
THAT THEY ARE NOT, THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY RULED IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.

POINT II
THE UTAH STATUTES HAVE NEVER REQUIRED OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED A RESERVATION OF MINERALS IN EXCHANGES
OF LAND WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
A__;.Sec. 65-1-15 UCA 1953 was designed to correct administrative abuses in sales and cannot
be extended to affect federal exct~r_ges.
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B-There can be no implied reservation in favor
of any grantor.
POINT III
THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL LEGISLATION,
TO THE EXCLUSION OF STATE STATUTES,
CONTROLS IF UTAH STATUTES SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED TO PROVIDE FOR A MINERAL
RESERVATION IN EXCHANGES.
POINT IV
FEDERAL EXCHANGES MUST BE OF EQUIVALENT ESTATES, AND THIS WAS AN
EQUIVALENT EXCHANGE ONLY IF THE
MINERAL ESTATE PASSED TO THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS SUCCESSORS, THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.
POINT V
VOLUMINOUS TRANSACTIONS EFFECTED
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER 1919 HAVE
EVOLVED A RULE OF PROPERTY CONCLUDING UTAH FROM ASSERTING TITLE
TO THE MINERALS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY
THE STATE OF UTAH IN A PROPRIETARY
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CAPACITY; HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING
THAT THEY ARE NOT, THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY RULED IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.
In Strand vs. State, 132 P. 2d 1011, 16 Wash. 2nd 107,
it is held that:
"The accepted rule is that a State acts in its
proprietary capacity when it undertakes to dispose
of public lands. This rule has been recognized almost since the inception of the principal of equitable
estoppel."
Cited for that proposition are numerous highly respected jurisdictions including the Federal Supreme Court
as it expressed the rule in United States vs. California and
Oregon Land Company, 148 U. S. 31, 13 S. Ct. 458, 37 L.
Ed. 354 and United States vs. Dalles Military Road Company, 148 U. S. 49, 13 S. Ct. 465, 37 L. Ed. 362. The facts
assumed by the rule and in existence in this case ( i. e. the
state disposing of public lands) take this litigation outside
of the scope of Van Wagoner vs. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418,
199 P. 670, a case applying the statute of limitations.
All rules of property must certainly militate against
a State acquiring an unfair advantage of an innocent purchaser merely by reason of the fact that the State is sovereign. Conceding as we do the high public purpose in preservation of trusts for the benefit of the public schools of
this State, it must nevertheless be that long established principles of equity and property cannot grant special dispensations or unfair immunity against supervening rights of
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innocent purchasers and proprietors of land to their great
detriment.
The defenses of estoppel, laches, unjust enrichment,
and all equitable doctrines should be available against a
state as well as against any other grantor of land irrespective of such state's capacity as a trustee. If a contrary rule
were adopted, there would be no capacity other than sovereign or governmental since every asset, chose in action, or
property interest of any government is held for the benefit
of its subjects or some segment thereof.
Notwithstanding the Court's holding upon this particular phase of the Appellant's argument we will demonstrate later that it is immaterial whether or not the State
holds school lands as a sovereign but nevertheless urge at
this point that the equities compel a holding, at least in the
narrow circumstance where the State disposes of property,.
that it is a proprietor as opposed to a sovereign.

POINT II
THE UTAH STATUTES HAVE NEVER REQUIRED OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED A RESERVATION OF MINERALS IN EXCHANGES
OF LAND WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

Section 65-1-27 1 and 65-l-70 2 UCA 1953 were a part
of the Revised Statutes of 1896 and continued substantially
unamended until the time of enactment of Section 65-1-15,
the statute upon which Appellant relies.
The Appellant argues that 65-1-27 applied not to ex..
changes of school lands but only to selection of other grants
made in the Enabling Act in quantity. The complete answer
to this is that the Indemnity Selection Act, now Sections 851
and 852, Title 43, USCA (Sections 2275, 2276 of the Revised
Statutes) was first enacted February 28, 1891, or five years
prior to the first adoption of 65-1-27 and 65-1-70. Therefore the Utah enactments were expressly implementary to
the Indemnity Exchange Act. The Appellant argues also
that at the time of enactment of 65-1-27 it was thought that
school lands, title to which had already vested in the State,
could not be exchanged for lands lying outside of Federal
Section 65-1-27
"All selections of land shall be made in legal subdivisions according to
the United States survey, and when a selection has been made and approved by the Board, it shall take such action as may be necessary to
secure the approval of the proper officers of the United States and the
final transfer to the state of the lands selected. The Board may cancel,
relinquish or release the claims of the State too, and may reconvey to
the United States, any particular tract of land erroneously listed to the
State, or any tract upon which, at the time of selection, a bona fide
claim has been initiated by an actual Settler."
1

2Section 65-1-70
"In order to compact, as far as practicable, the land holdings of the
State, the Board is hereby authorized to exchange any of the land held
by the State for other land of equal value within the State held by
other proprietors; and upon request of the Board the Governor is hereby authorized to execute and deliver the necessary patents to such
-other proprietors and receive therefrom proper deeds of the lands so
exchanged; provided that no exchange shall be made by the Land
Board until the patent for the land so received in exchange shall have
been issued to such proprietors or their grantors."
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reservations. The simple explanation is that at the time
California vs. Deseret Water, Oil and Irrigation Company,
243 U.S. 214, 37 S. Ct. 394, was decided in 1917 the United
States Supreme Court said:
"Selections aggregating many thousands of acres
have been made in reliance upon [the Land Decision
holding that vested school sections could be exchanged
under Sec. 2275] and that no doubt large expenditures of money have been made in good faith upon
the selected lands. It is therefore urged that such
construction has become a rule of property. In this
situation we should be slow to disturb a ruling of
the Department of the government to which is committed the administration of public lands."
Both Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 are sufficiently broad to
embrace, and in fact have always been intended to embrace,
exchanges of vested school lands lying within the exterior
boundaries of a national forest for indemnity lands selected
outside said reservation.
Section 65-1-70 authorizes an exchange by the State
Land Board "with any other proprietors". The Appellant
cannot seriously contend that the Federal Government is
not a "proprietor" of land within this State. It seems to
advance an argument that the revision of the Utah Statutes
in 1933 to delete the phrasing "by the Government of the
United States" has relation back to 1925 to impose an unnatural construction upon 65-1-70 never intended. This
Court is amply aware of the authority granted to the commission to revise the 1933 Statutes and readily will perceive that the deletion of the matter cited by the Appellant
was purely to remove surplusage. It would be ridiculous,
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.we claim, to ascribe to a 1933 amendment made by the code
commission any manifestation of legislative intent to enact
·a rule of construction upon a statute applicable retroactively
to the year 1925.
We are certain that this court will not seriously consider the argument advanced in tedious and meticulous
detail by the Appellant that Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70
did not in 1925 authorize the Utah State Land Board to
make exchanges with the Federal government of lands lying
within a National Forest granted to the State by the Enabling Act for lands lying outside a National Forest and
owned by the United States.
A-Sec. 65-1-15 UCA 1953 was designed to correct administrative abuses in sales and cannot
be extended to affect federal exchanges.
Section 65-1-15 can relate only to sales. The language
of the Act is :
"All coal and other mineral deposited in lands
belonging to the State of Utah are hereby reserved to
the State. Such deposits are reserved from sale.

* * *"
The second proviso is an express restriction on the scope
of the first sentence. In the Utah case of Bird and Jex
Company, et al. vs. Funk, et al., 85 P. 2d 831, 96 Utah 450,
it is stated that the office of a proviso in a statute is to
qualify or restrain its generality or to exclude some possible
ground of misinterpretation of it as extending to cases not

intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview.
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This is the exact situation with which we are confronted
here. The proviso must limit the scope of the first sentence
to restrict its application singularly to sales.
The transaction with which we are here concerned is
an "exchange" and not a "sale". "Sale" is not synonymous
with "exchange". See the numerous cases collected .in Volume 38 Words and Phrases, pages 100 to 105. In Haun vs.
Malone, 176 N. W. 393, the Supreme Court of Iowa held
that:
"The test for determining whether there has
been a sale or exchange of property is whether there
was a fixed price for which the exchange was to
be made. If there was a fixed price, the transaction
is a sale, if not, an exchange."
The State's Statutes contain a number of provisiOns expressly dealing with "sales" ( 65-1-31 et. seq., 65-1-41, 65-142) all contemplating the transfer of property for a fixed,
money consideration. Watson vs. Odell, 198 P. 772, 58 Utah
276, holds that a "sale" means the transfer of property for
money.
Section 65-1-27 deals particularly with exchanges as
does 65-1-70. It is a cardinal rule of construction that as
between two statutes apparently in conflict the one dealing
more particularly or specifically with the subject matter
must prevail over the one dealing with it generally. University of Utah vs. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P. 96. As
opposed to the argument advanced by the Appellant that
State executives are prohibited from making an exchange
of both the State's mineral and surface interests, Section
65-1-27 requires the State Land Board to "take all action
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required to secure the approval of the United States for
the transfer to the State of lands selected." This would
require alienation of the minerals under the express holding of Wyoming vs. United States, 255 U. S. 489, 41 S. Ct.
393, argued more fully hereinafter, and the essential interpretation of other Federal legislation. Section 65-1-70, cumulatively to 65-1-27, permits exactly the transaction which
occurred here-an exchange of land within a national forest
for unappropriated public domain outside. The direct testimony at the trial, modified on cross examination, may have
been that the transactions here did not "compact" the
State's holdings. Even assuming that the testimony was
competent to prove that we are confident that the State,
having acted upon the pretext of compliance with the Statute cannot rescind any exchange solely because one officer's
opinion is that the strict letter of the enactment was not
followed. But the result directed by the legislature WaS
reached in any event, to-wit: The extrication of the State's
interest from the inaccessibility of location within a forest
reserve, precisely the situation viewed by the United States
Supreme Court in California vs. Deseret Wate-r, Oil & Irrigation Company, 243 U. S. 415, 37 S. Ct. 394.
It is very evident that 65-1-15 deals particularly and

exclusively with "sales"; that 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 deal particularly and to the express exclusion of 65-1-15, with "exchanges". The sections are entirely harmonious and consistent yet, when dealing with a particular transaction,
mutually exclusive to and with each other.
The foregoing argument is given great additional
weight by reference to Page 28 of the Laws of 1917, where
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there was appropriated $25,000.00 for an investigation of
the State Land Board and other State agencies, and to Page
469 of the 1919 House Journal, containing a report of the
Committee which made that investigation.
Out of this report arose Chapter 107 of the Laws of
Utah 1919, which is now Section 65-1-15, the statute upon
which the Appellant relies. This report is a public document of which this court may take judicial notice and contains an account of numerous sales of public lands by the
State for small and insufficient consideration, which lands
for their valuable minerals were being sold for many times
their cost by the persons who had dealt unscrupulously with
the State. The report recommended that sales be suspended
for five years and that the lands be leased during the moratorium. The report further recommended that the State
continue to take the greatest possible advantage of available exchanges with the Federal Government to compact
the State's holdings, to extricate its lands inside reservations and to consolidate holdings within national forests;
to release interests of the State in desert school sections
and secure indemnity lands suitable for grazing.
This Court must look to the evil sought to be corrected

by the enacted bill and no further. Norville vs. Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2nd 937, 126 A. L. R. 1318. The
evil certainly did not lie in exchanges with the Federal Government; it lay only in sales to private individuals and the
latter are the only class of situations to which Section 651-15 can be given application.
B-There can be no implied reservation in favor
of any grantor.
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A general conveyance of land without any exception
or reservation of the minerals therein carries with it the
minerals as well as the surface. Montana Mining Co. vs.
St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., 204 U. S. 204, 51 L. Ed.
444, 27 S. Ct. 254.
The presumption established as an ancient principle in
the law of property is that the grantor conveys the land
free from any reservation, except such as he has expressed
in his own grant. Georgia vs. Cincinnati S. R. Co., 248 U.
S. 26, 63 L. Ed. 104, 39 S. Ct. 14.
The stipulation of the parties hereto (Tr. p. 11) accurately expresses that a reservation of minerals is non-existent in those documents by which the parties consummated
an exchange of the disputed lands from the State of Utah to
the United States of America. In fact the grant negatives
any intention to create a reservation by being absolute in
form. The selection list recites that the
"State of Utah makes application under the provisions of the acts of Congress of July 16, 1894, [the
enabling act] and the acts supplementary and amendatory thereto for the following described unappropriated non-mineral public lands in lieu of, or as indemnity for, the corresponding school lands, for
losses to its grant for common schools, assigned and
designated as bases therefore, and agrees to accept
the selected tracts in full satisfaction of the bases
assigned."
Embodied in the Indemnity Exchange Act, (Section
851, Title 43), there is the following language:
"The selection of lands in lieu thereof by the
state or territory shall be a waiver of its right to
said sections."
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"Waiver of right" can only refer to those rights which
were conferred upon the state by virtue of Section 6 of the
Enabling Act, wherein the state is granted all Sections 2,
16, 32 and 36. A "waiver of right" is a "relinquishment or
refusal to accept a right," In re Auerbach's Estate, 65 P.
488, 23 Utah 529. In Smiley vs. Barker, 83 F. 684 (9th Cir.)
a waiver is defined as
"where one in possession of any right, whether conferred by law or by contract, and of full knowledge
of the material facts, does or forebears the doing of
something inconsistent with the existence of the
right or of his intention to rely upon it. Thereupon,
he is said to have waived it, and he is precluded
from claiming anything by reason of it afterwards."
See also the numerous cases collected in Vol. 44, page 419,
WORDS AND PHRASES.
The term "right", when referring to property interests,
includes all the interest, estate, claim or title of the individual granting by use of that term, in the property affected.
See Shewell vs. Board of Goshen Union Local School District, 96 North East 2nd, 323 88 Ohio App. 1, where it was
held that:
"The provision in a deed conveying realty 'except the "right" owned by the school district or board
of education to about one-fourth of an acre being
used as a school house lot,' constituted an exception
of the fee simple title to the school lot and was not
merely an expression of permissive use."
The Enabling Act contains language of exact itnport
and can be construed only to mean that title to the entire
surface and mineral interests were transferred to the Fed-
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eral Government when the State selected lieu lands. Section 6 of that Act requires an exchange of equivalents, stating that Sections numbered 2, 16, 32 and 36 or other lands
equivalent thereto are granted, indemnity lands to be selected in such manner as the Legislature may provide with
approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Section 12, para.,
graph 3 of the Enabling Act provides that the State of Utah
shall not be entitled to any further or other grants of land
and Section 13 provides that indemnity lands shall be selected under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior.
Indemnity land is additional and therefore "other" lands if
a part of the fee simple estate in base lands is reserved.
Thus the State of Utah is, contrary to Section 12 of the
Enabling Act, receiving "further and other lands" if it
reserves minerals in lieu exchanges. Clearly a state reservation of minerals is entirely inconsistent with the express,
affirmative, language of the Enabling Act.
There being no express reservation, but on the contrary an absolute grant of the mineral estate, recited in the
instruments (Exhibits "A" and "B") effecting the exchange, the only remaining consideration can be whether
or not the Utah State Statute (65-1-15) can be extended
so as to embrace this transaction.
A parallel pronouncement and of equal dignity to the
principle against implied reservations is the universally accepted rule that a statute may not be extended by construction beyond the purpose intended by the Legislature. United
States vs M eElvain, 272 U. S. 633, 71 L. Ed. 451, 47 S. Ct.
219. As we have pointed out in the argument on the preceding Sub-Point, the legislation upon which the Plaintiff relies
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here was directed toward abuses practiced in the Land
Board in the sales of public and school lands to private
persons for their mineral value and was never intended to
apply to the Federal Government or to exchanges therewith; on the contrary, Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 were
intended by the Legislature to continue to control those
exchanges. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact
that Section 65-1-15 was introduced in the Legislature by
then State Senator George H. Dern, who later became Governor of the State of Utah, holding office for two terms
between 1925 and 1933; further that during his terms as
Governor, he was by virtue of such office Chairman of
the State Land Board which was comprised of the Governor,
Secretary of State, and the Attorney General, and that as
Chairman of the Land Board, he effected numerous exchanges with the Federal Government and at no time attempted to make any reservation of minerals in such exchanges. Many hundreds of exchanges had in fact been
made long before the introduction of Section 65-1-15 into
the provisions of Utah law, and the Legislatures successively
had understood and agreed that the provisions of Sections
65-1-27 and 65-1-70 were sufficient implementary legislation to authorize and to continue to authorize the exchanges.
Numerous exchanges were carried on both before and after
the enactment of Section 65-1-15 involving in excess of a
million acres of land and are matters of public record within
the Utah State Land Board, and therefore matters of which
this Court may take judicial notice. State Board of Land
Commissioners vs. Ririe, 56 Ut. 213, 190 P. 59 and Section
78-25-1, U. C. A. 1953. Virtually no changes and certainly
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no changes of any consequence have been made in the provisions of 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 since the date of their enactment in 1896 to the present time.
Two fundamental rules of property sharply limit 651-15: First, a statute may not be extended by construction
beyond the purpose intended by the Legislature, and Second, no grant nor the words contained therein may be extended by implication in order to create a reservation in
favor of the grantor.
The practical construction given a statute for a long
period of time has been considered strong evidence of the
meaning of the law. Such contemporaneous or practical
construction is treated by the Courts as of importance, and
as entitled to great weight, respect and persuasive influence. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes Section 319. The interpretation placed upon the statute by the Utah State Land Board
and by the Legislature itself is clearly indicated by the
action of the Legislature in Chapter 56, Laws of 1927, to
provide an express reservation of minerals when conveying
lands to the United States at the mouth of Bear River forming a part of the bed of the Great Salt Lake. The construction placed by the Legislature itself upon Sections 65-1-27,
65-1-15 and 65-1-70 is to the effect that minerals are not
reserved when dealing with the Federal Government or its
wards. See Chapter 144, Laws of 1957 wherein a sale of
lands to the Ute Indian Tribe contained another express
reservation of minerals.
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POINT III
THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL LEGISLATION,
TO THE EXCLUSION OF STATE STATUTES,
CONTROLS IF UTAH STATUTES SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED TO PROVIDE FOR A MINERAL
RESERVATION IN EXCHANGES.
The Appellant in its brief cites the case of Newton vs.
State Board of Land Commissioners, et al., 37 Idaho 58, 219
P. 1053. Upon close observation of the facts in that case,
including the Admissions Bill and State Constitution requiring that School Section lands be disposed of only at
public sale and for not less than $10.00 an acre, it will
readily be observed that the State of Idaho has organic provisions prohibiting exchanges of land for any purpose, a
situation clearly not obtaining in the State of Utah.
We are not before this Court to argue that the State
of Utah does riot have sovereignty to legislate with respect
to exchanges which it effects with the Federal Government,
nor are we here to state that the Federal Government may
legislate with respect to interests vested in the State of
Utah without implementing and consensual state enactments. We do contend, however, that the State of Utah had
to observe, in effecting these exchanges, the provisions of
Federal Law as applied by decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and that never did any of the executive or
legislative officers of the State of Utah at any times material to these proceedings believe that such implementing
and consensual legislation was not in existence as the longpracticed, consistent, uniform, and practical construction
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of those statutes shows abundantly. The legislature in enacting Section 65-1-15 had no intention, design or purpose
to prohibit the State of Utah from entering into exchanges
with the Federal Government for the benefit of the State.
We also doubt that it is necessary for the Court here
to apply the doctrine of Dyer vs. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951);
nevertheless if this Court should hold that the Utah statutes have contemplated a reservation of minerals in exchanges with the Federal Government or that the officiak;
of the State of Utah had no state-enacted authority to enter
into exchanges with the Federal Government upon the terms
imposed by Federal Legislation as construed by U. S. Supreme Court Decisions, then Dyer vs. Sims is clearly in
point. In that case the officers of the State of West Virginia
had committed that State to an interstate compact which
was later ratified by Congress. The United States Supreme
Court held that at the point of ratification the interpretation
of the West Virginia Constitution became a Federal question. Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the Court at 341
U. S., page 28, said :
"Of course every deference will be shown to
what the highest court of the State deems to be the
law and policy of its state, particularly where recondite or unique features of local law are urged.
Deference is one thing; submission to a State's own
determination of whether it has undertaken an obligation, what that obligation is, and whether it conflicts with the disability of the state to undertake
it is quite another."
A concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Robert M. Jackson indicated that West Virginia was estopped from repudiating the contract.
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POINT IV
FEDERAL EXCHANGES MUST BE OF EQUIVALENT ESTATES, AND THIS WAS AN
EQUIVALENT EXCHANGE ONLY IF THE
MINERAL ESTATE PASSED TO THE UNITED
STATES AND ITS SUCCESSORS, THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS.
In the case of Wyoming vs. United States, 255 U. S.
489, the State of Wyoming waived its right to a school tract
within a Federal reservation and selected in lieu thereof
a tract of equal acreage from the public lands within the
State and outside the reservation, and it performed every
act which was required of it in waiving its base lands and
selecting lieu lands. The application remained in the General Land Office awaiting consideration for three years.
In the meantime, minerals were indicated and the selected
lands were withdrawn. The Commissioners then came to
consider the selection by Wyoming and declined to approve·
it demanding that the State either accept a limited-surface
right-interest or withdraw the selection.
The United States Supreme Court held that when a
state has done all that is required of it in relinquishing its
school tract in place and selecting another tract therefor,
the Department has no alternative but to approve the list.
With respect to the demand that the State of Wyoming
relinquish its interest in the minerals in the selected land,
the Court approved a statement in Kern Oil vs. Clark, 30
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L. D. 560 construing a land selection under the Act of June
4, 1897, identical to the laws applicable here, which stated:
"The act clearly contemplates an exchange of
equivalents. Such is the unmistakable import of
its terms. In the case of relinquishment of patented
lands, title is to be given by the government for title
received."
All of the language of Federal Legislation which we
have hereinbefore quoted contemplates a "right" for a
"right", and "interest" for an "interest" and title for title.
We are confident that the same spirit has always been
intended by the State of Utah and its Legislature as expressed in Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70.
Plaintiff argues in its brief that because state selections must be made in lands "not known to be mineral in
character," the State of Utah presumptively acquired lands
subject to a mineral reservation and therefore the exchange
was an "exchange of equivalents".
The complete answer to this contention is that the
State of Utah was never supposed to have received any lands
"known to be valuable for minerals" by virtue of the Enabling Act or any other congressional grant. United States
vs. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 62 L. Ed. 473, 38 S. Ct. 193. Thus
the State of Utah gets an exact "exchange of equivalents"
when it waives all its rights (including surface and mineral estates) to lands by present knowledge non-mineral in
character (which was all it was entitled to receive in the
first instance) for other lands also by present knowledge
non-mineral in ·Character.
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The second argument against Plaintiff's untenable
position here is that there is a vast difference between lands
valuable for minerals in this age and lands "known to be
valuable for minerals" in 1925. This is boldly illustrated
by virtually every currently-producing oil or gas field in
the State of Utah. None of those lands were known to be
mineral in 1925. It is so fundamental that the Court's attention need not be drawn to the proposition that an absolute reservation of minerals is an overwhelmingly greater
burden upon one receiving lands than an injunction not to
select lands then "known to be valuable for minerals".
The controlling and pertinent legislation, both Federal
and State, contemplate an exchange of equivalent titles and
any reservation by one party destroys that result.

POINT V
VOLUMINOUS TRANSACTIONS EFFECTED
BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER 1919 HAVE
EVOLVED A RULE OF PROPERTY CONCLUDING UTAH FROM ASSERTING TITLE
TO THE MINERALS.
In the history of exchanges by the State of Utah with
the Federal Government, in excess of a million acres have
been transferred by the Federal Government to this State
and an equivalent number have been transferred in consideration therefor by this State to the Federal Government.
These exchanges have all transpired under the scope of the
United States Supreme Court decisions cited including California vs. Deseret Water, Oil and Irrigation Company,
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supra, and Wyoming vs. United States, supra. This Court
may take judicial notice of the fact that hundreds
of thousands of acres have been exchanged since May 12,
1919 as a continuing, uninterrupted flow of the same transactions as were occurring prior to the adoption of 65-1-15.
These enormous proportions of real property and the numerous exchanges entered into superimposed upon which are
the rights of third parties and the extensive improvements
placed thereupon by purchasers from both the Federal and
State governments have all given rise to a "rule of property" under the equivalent estate principle of Wyoming vs.
United States that cannot now be unsettled by a strained
construction of Section 65-1-15.
An estoppel may arise against a State out of a transaction in which it acted even in its governmental capacity
if an estoppel is necessary to prevent loss to another and
the perpetration of a fraud and if such estoppel would not
impair the exercise of a sovereign power of the state. 19
Am. Jur. Estoppel, Sec. 166. See also Corpus Juris Secundum, Estoppel, Sec. 138-140.

CONCLUSION
I"

All the pertinent events must be viewed in one perspective and chronologically as they occurred.
First, there was in existence in 1891 the School Lands
Ipdemnity Act and its amendments authorizing vested
school lands within federal reservations or withdra,vals to
be exchanged for lands outside the withdrawn area.
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Second, the Enabling Act was adopted in 1894 granting
to the State of Utah Sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 or "other
lands equivalent thereto * * * such indemnity lands
to be selected within said state in such manner as the legislature may provide with the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior."
Third, there follows an exchange of millions of acres
in hundreds of transactions, under the scope and aegis of
Wyoming vs. United States interpreting those laws to prescribe an exchange of equivalent estates, all of which exchanges were effected under the Federal statutes and Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70, U. C. A. 1953.
The next occurrence significant to this litigation was
an obscure amendment, advanced on the theory that abuses
were being practiced by the administrative officers of the
land board in connection with sales of state lands to private
individuals, to reserve minerals in the event of "sales" without any repeal or modification either expressly or by implication of Section 65-1-27 or 65-1-70 and without any clear
or even veiled threat of jeopardy to the mineral interests
in lands being acquired from the State of Utah by the Federal Government and its successors and assigns-65-1-15.
Still a free, full flow of exchanges between the State
and the Federal Government continues uninterrupted with
the Governor of the State of Utah, who had been the senator
in 1919 who introduced the provisions of what is now 651-15, administering as the chief executive officer of the
land board the same transactions without voicing any objection or demanding the insertion of a reservation in favor
of the State of Utah.
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Next, the Federal Government assigns, the fee simple
estate to the lands acquired from the State of Utah to these
defendants and respondents who are bona fide purchasers
for value with no notice of any nature of the rights claimed
by the State of Utah under the tenuous precepts now advanced by counsel.
From a reversal of the Trial Court there would now
stem loss to thousands of other proprietors of millions of
dollars in valuable lands, improvements, and mineral interests.
We contend that the Lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN,
Richfield, Utah,

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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